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WARRANTS UPON WARRANTS: THE PEN REGISTER AND PROBABLE CAUSE
UNDER OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL*
GEORGE V. HIGGINS
The author is an Assistant Attorney General, Organized Crime Section, Criminal Division, Department of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. He received his LL.B. degree from
Boston College in 1967. He also holds an A.B. from Boston College (1961) and an M.A. from Stanford
(1965). His "Omnicompetence and Omnibus Crime Control: The Policeman as Specialist", appeared
earlier in this Journal. He is co-author, with Charles H. Rogovin, of "Organized Crime in Massachusetts," Law and Disorder,Tufts University Assembly on Massachusetts Government, 1968.
Now that Congress has passed the "Omnibus Crime Control Act" of 1968, permitting limited use of
electronic surveillance which previously had been prohibited by § 605 of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934, what is the present legal status of law enforcement usage of the so-called "pen register"a device which records phone numbers called and calls received without monitoring or recording conversations? This is the question the author attempts to answer in the present paper.

The pen register logs numbers dialed from a
telephone, without monitoring any conversations.
It can be installed with a fair expectation that it
will not be immediately detected. For years it has
been attractive to law enforcement officers investigating crimes committed in whole or in part by
the use of the telephone. Now that Section 605 of
the Federal Communications Act of 1934 has been
amended by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 to permit interception of telephone communications under proper circumstances, the device seems more attractive than
ever.' It appears as a useful means to develop
* The views herein expressed are those of the author,
and do not represent a statement of any position by the
Massachusetts Department of the Attorney General.
I Prior to the 1968 amendment, Section 605 read as
follows:
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or
transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any
interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
thereof, except through authorized channels of
transmission or reception, to any person other than
the addressee, his agent, or attorney, or to a person
employed or authorized to forward such communication to its destination, or to proper accounting or distributing officers of the various communicating centers over which the communication may
be passed, or to the master of a ship under whom he
is serving, or in response to a subpena issued by a
court of competent jurisdiction, or on demand of
other lawful authority; and no person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of such intercepted communication to any person;
and no person not being entitled thereto shall re-

probable cause to seek a warrant or order to make
a wiretap.
This appearance may be fatal to the successful
prosecution of a significant case because of three
federal court decisions, handed down in 1965 and
1966, condemning the use of the pen register as
per se violative of Section 605.
As then worded, Section 605 forbade the interception and divulgence of the existence, content
ceive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio and use the same
or any information contained therein for his own
benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled
thereto; and no person having received such intercepted communication or having become acquainted with the contents, substance, purport,
ect or meaning of the same or any part thereof,
knowing that such information was so obtained,
shall divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of any part
thereof, or use the same or any information therein
contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of
another not entitled thereto; Provided, that this
section shall not apply to the receiving, divulging,
publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio
communication broadcast, or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of the general public, or
relating to ships in distress. June 19, 1934, c. 652,
Title VI, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103, 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1962).
By the terms of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, P.L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 7
U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ai. NEws 1495 § 803 the following terms were added to the initial paagraph of § 605:
"Except as authorized by chapter 119, title 18,
United States Code, no person receiving, assisting
in receiving .... "
18 U.S.C. § 2518 provides a probable cause procedure
for obtaining a court order for the interception of
communications.
2245 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
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or effect of, telephonic communications. These decisions were United States v. Guglielmo, 2 United
States v. Caplan,' and United States v. Dote.4 The
terms of these decisions were so slack as to invite
the inference that while the dispositive words
descended from Section 605, the force behind them
derived from the majesty of the Fourth Amendment.
At the time, this elasticity of meaning may not
have seemed to merit much consideration. The federal courts had long employed Section 605 to bar
from evidence at trial the words of telephonic
communications intercepted by wiretap. 5 With
similar resolve, the Supreme Court of the United
States had declined to impose this handicap upon
state law enforcement officers. In Olmstead v.
United States,6 the Court decreed that the spoken
word was not protected by the Fourth Amendment. In Schwartz v. Texas,7 the Court refused to
require State courts to exclude evidence of the
spoken word, notwithstanding the fact that it had
been obtained in violation of Section 605. Thus no
reading of the Gugiielmo,8 Caplan9 and Dote"
decisions, could, at the time the decisions were
rendered, do more than dissuade federal law enforcement officers from employing the pen register
to detect the commission of crimes perpetrated in
whole or in part by means of telephonic communication."
' 255 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
4371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966), affirming United
States v. Guglielmo, supra note 2.
6See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937);
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
6277 U.S. 438 (1928).
7 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
89 Supra note 2.
Supra note 3.
10Supra note 4.
1 Altogether too little attention has been paid to this
innovation in the problems of criminal law. In his
Conflict of Laws In Time: The Sweep of New Rules in
CriminalLaw, 1967 Duxx L.J. 713, Chief justice Roger
J. Traynor of the Supreme Court of California reviewed
some of the dislocations resulting from simultaneous
modification of the criminal laws by the courts and
legislatures, generally accomplished without adequate
reference to the issues raised in consequence. Pivoting
on the question of whether decisions, modifying the
criminal process, ought to be prospective or retrospective, the Traynor article was unusual in that it focussed
upon the effects achieved upon police work, by decisions
aimed at influencing police work. Perhaps the failure to
make this connection lay at the root of the GuglielmoCaplan-Dote series of decisions, and the difficulties
which they now portend: in theory the cases merely
served to reassert a long-standing limitation imposed
upon law enforcement officers, but in fact their reasoning went a good deal beyond such reassertion. This
reflects the occasionally frustrating disparity between
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The decisions survived upon the books, but the
times changed. Late in 1966, Olmstead underwent
significant erosion. In Osborn v. United States,"
the Court attributed to the Fourth Amendment
what the Olmstead Court had decried as "an enlarged and unusual meaning" 1: the inclusion of
spoken words within the definition of "things'
protected in possession against unreasonable
search and seizure. In Osborn, the Court carefully
evaluated the constitutional propriety of the use
of a recording device (installed upon the person
of a consenting undercover operative) and deliberated extensively upon the adequacy of theprecedent "detailed factual affidavit" supplied to
provide the antecedent justification, noting itsassertion of "the commission of a specific criminal
offense" and stressing that the device was employed for a "narrow and particularized purpose." 14
On June 12, 1967, six months after Osborn, theCourt decided Berger v. New York15 There "'conversation' was within the Fourth Amendment's
protections, and ... the use of electronic devices
to capture it was a 'search' within the meaning of
the Amendment .... 16 The decision in Olmstead
was dismissed as having been "negated by our
subsequent cases...,"'
none of which was
named.
Berger left a vacuum. It finished off the position
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the
spoken word, without indicating how the Fourth
Amendment was to apply to the protection of the
spoken word. That deficiency the Court sought to
remedy in Katz v. United States,1 decided six
months after Berger.
In Katz the Court, reviewing acts committed by
federal agents who had installed an eavesdropping
the realities controlling appellate decisions-delivered
on the basis of resolution of contending ideas-and
pre-trial, police investigation, which is conducted,
ideally, with some considerable reference to the views
of appellate courts, but administered in afactual context. Law enforcement officers are compelled to assert
a "right to rely" upon the ideological representations of
the condition of the law made by appellate courts of
record, notwithstanding the fact that this reliance may
be rather rudely disappointed by a new appellate
representation, contradictory of the old, and handed
down when curative pre-trial investigation of a given
case, developed conformably to the new position, is no
longer possible.
385 U.S. 323 (1966).
"3277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
14385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966).
I"388 U.S. 41 (1967).
16Id. at 51.
17Ibid.
-389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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device on an outdoor public telephone booth, found
it "dear that this surveillance was so narrowly
circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate,
properly notified of the need for such investigation, specifically informed of the basis on which it
was to proceed, and dearly apprised of the precise
intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally
have authorized, with appropriate safeguards,
the very limited search and seizure that the
Government asserts in fact took place." ' 9 Convinced that a "judicial order could have accommodated 'the legitimate needs of law enforcement'
by authorizing the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance,"'2 the Court concluded:
"The government agents here ignored 'the
procedure of antecedent justification ... that
is central to the Fourth Amendment.' a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance
involved in this case. Because the surveillance
here failed to meet that condition, and because
it led to the petitioner's conviction, the judgment must be reversed." "
Notwithstanding its distastefulness to the federal investigators directly involved, the Katz decision constituted a substantial contribution to
the resolution of a perplexing conflict among dissonant concepts theretofore randomly developed
in the law of telecommunications.
Prior to Katz there remained among law enforcement officers (and their legal advisors) some
lingering doubt whether electronic surveillance
would ever be conclusively adjudicated as a constitutional method of search and seizure. This
uncertainty was nourished by Berger v. New York:
"It is said that neither a warrant nor a statute
authorizing eavesdropping can be drawn so as to
meet the Fourth Amendment's requirements. If
this be true then the 'fruits' of eavesdropping devices are barred under the Amendment." " The
effect of this uncertainty almost certainly was to
discourage law enforcement officers from employing
electronic surveillance in cases of any importance
lest they ruin a case against a defendant of more
than usual significance. (In the usual course of
events, the use of such comparatively complicated
measures is likely to be considered only in "important" cases.) And this discouragement, of course,
1"Id. at 354.
20 Id. at 356.
21Id. at 359.
22 Supra note 15, at 63.

tended to diminish the prospect of developing
tactics of electronic surveillance likely to pass
constitutional muster. Katz, firmly establishing
the potential constitutional use of electronic surveillance, eliminated that conceptual uncertainty.
Again, before the decision in Katz, those law
enforcement officers who were sincerely convinced
that electronic surveillance could be fitted into a
constitutional scheme of search and seizure were
as paralyzed operationally as those doubting its
primary constitutionality. Persuaded that electronic surveillance could be constitutionally conducted, they were still unable to say, with any
realistic assurance, what methods should be employed. From a variety of procedures, it was all
but impossible to choose with any confidence precisely those alternatives which a court would later
approve as satisfying constitutional standards.
Once more it must be noted that the peculiar
characteristics of electronic surveillance-the
delicacy of its application, the need for specialized
personnel to perform it effectively, and the relative expense of its employment-which practically
limit it to use in significant cases, also functioned
in this setting to check any inclination to experiment. Thus the pre-Katz uncertainty on the operational level also served to decrease the probability
that constitutionally adequate procedures would
be fashioned empirically by trial and error. Katz
obviated this uncertainty."
The importance of this definitional function
was immense. Taken together with Osbornu and
Berger,srKatz completed the chore set by the Court
for itself, the bringing of spoken words within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. It then
proceeded to insure that the protection conferred
2 It is significant that clarification of the conceptual
conflicts, and those arising from procedural uncertainties, was left to the Supreme Court of the United
States. As was the case with problems of arrest, interrogation, and the extensiveness of the right to be represented by counsel, there appears to be adequate justification for the persuasion that judicial intervention in
law enforcement problems is in large part the product
of legislative refusal to act, where action is plainly
required. As suggested in note 11 supra, the most
damaging condition of the law, from a law enforcement
point
of view, is uncertainty. Notwithstanding copious
grumbling,
public and private, to the contrary, the fact
is that capable law enforcement officials are reasonably
amenable to the need to adapt to new, or merely different, procedural rules. But they feel themselves entitled
to demand that the reliance manifested by such adaptation not be capriciously rebuked by a retrospective
declaration of new procedures, functioning to set free
offenders caught under the previous rationale.
2Supra note 12.
25 Supra note 15.
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upon the possession of spoken words should be no
greater than the protection given to tangible possessions. Thus the privacy accorded to persons
communicating orally is no closer to absolute than
the privacy vouchsafed to persons communicating
in writing: it may be constitutionally invaded by
a law enforcement officer, pursuant to a warrant,
issued "upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." 26
There nowhere appears, in this eminently rational solution to the problems engendered by the
contending claims of personal privacy and community security in the field of communications,
any legitimate reason to discriminate among methods of oral communication, nor to pronounce on
the basis of such discrimination any more extensive protection for one than for another. Once the
presumption is made, that spoken words are properly included among "things" protected in possession by the Fourth Amendment, and the procedures set down forestalling that protection from
becoming absolute, the social adjustment required
for comparatively frictionless coexistence of the
interests of privacy and law enforcement would,
in the abstract, seem to be complete. But such
adjustments, of course, are never made in the abstract, and this one was accomplished in the area
partially occupied by Section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934.
Section 605-enacted as a regulation of the communications industry, elevated judicially to a rule
of evidence, and long since unsucessfully, albeit
most energetically, challenged in that guise--was
not discernibly affected by the Osborn-Berger-Katz
sequence of decisions. While those cases attacked
and demolished a great source of confusion in the
law of telecommunications, they did not explain
what renders absolutely sacred all which is mechanically communicated. Briefly, it will be remembered that when Olmstead v. United Statesn endured
as good law denying Fourth Amendment protection to the spoken word in possession, spoken words
said face-to-face were per se vulnerable to seizure
without warrant, but by virtue of Section 605,
words spoken over the telephone were rendered
different from those addressed to a person within
earshot. That difference, championed in a number
of high and lower decisions over a period of some
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
"ISupra note 6.
26
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thirty years, was sufficient in all of its majestic unreasonableness to preclude its own correction by
the Osborn-Berger-Katz rationale. Thus between
December of 1967, when Katz became the law of
the land, and June of 1968, when a new decision
and a new statute again altered the law, all spoken
words except those communicated with mechanical
assistance were open to constitutional search and
seizure, but none of those communicated by telephone, radio, or other protected means could ever
legally be seized. To this was added a further complication: if words spoken into a protected system
were illegally seized by a State law enforcement
officer, they could be legally admitted into evidence
in a State court under Schwartz.
This condition was twice attacked in June of
1968. The development first in logic, the decision
in Lee v. Florida,2 was chronologically second,
coming down on June 17. The statute, the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,21 was
enacted on June 6, but in a universe controlled by
pure logic would have followed the decision in Lee.
Lee overruled Schwartz v. Texas,0 In Lee, the
Court held that the exclusionary rule fashioned in
Nardone v. United States," to limit the zeal of
federal officers eager to tap wires must now be
extended to apply to State officers and State courts.
This decision failed to reach the obvious problem created by decisions interpreting Section 605
and exacerbated by the developments in Osborn,
Berger and Katz: the difficulty of understanding
why words spoken into a telephone, or other protected communications system, should be absolutely protected against all searches, when words
spoken without such mechanical assistance were
now protected only against unreasonable searches.
But it did have the merit of preparing the way
for the correction of that difficulty, inasmuch as
it placed federal and State officers on the same
footing, and evenhandedly obliged them to bow
to the same illogic.
That correction had in fact been made--or at
least attempted--some twelve days before the
decision in Lee, when Congress passed the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. In
Title II, Section 803, Congress amended Section
605 of the Communications Act of 1934 to permit
the interception and divulgence of telephonic and
- 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
29 See note 1, supra.
"0Supra note 7.
81 Supra note 5.
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broadcast communications, provided that the interception is accomplished conformably to criteria
of constitutional searches strikingly resembling
those established in the Osborn-Berger-Katz rationale.
This legislation, long overdue, appears to complete the corrective process urgently required by
American law of telecommunications ever since
the first Nardone case, decided in 1937.32 At long
last it appears that the law of telecommunications
has been satisfactorily adjusted to achieve a balance between claims of equal importance, and that
the terms of that adjustment are the same for
federal officers working toward federal trials and
State officers preparing cases for trial in State
courts.
Unfortunately, that word "appears" must be
stressed. In an area long characterized by uncertainty, some uncertainty yet endures. In part, at
least, it is the product of the decisions in United
States v. Guglielmo,u United States v. Caplan," and
United States v. Dote.5 Primarily, it suggests that
telephonic communications may still lie beyond
the pale of "things" that can be seized in conformity with the Constitution of the United States.
II
In 1965, Orlando W. Wilson, then Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, testified
before the Illinois Crime Commission on the subject of wiretapping.36 His remarks deserve some
review:
"Under our present law, the higher-ups in
organized crime are given complete immunity
in their oral and telephonic communications.
Whatever they say over the telephone or to
their fellow criminals, face to face, is completely protected and immune from interception by law enforcement officers. This
shouldn't be. The very fact that the telephone
exists has made law enforcement more difficult. It permits the higher-ups in organized
rackets to conspire and carry out their illegal
2 Ibid.
13Supra note 2.
34Supra note 3.
' Supra note 4.
26It should be noted that the Wilson position is
cited only as exemplary. Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy,
Atty. Gen. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, and the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of justice, among sundry other spokesmen
for law enforcement, stressed the importance of electronic surveillance in the effort against organized crime.

activities by telephone and to issue directions
to their underlings without committing any
overt acts themselves that might result in apprehension by the police or other law enforcement officers. Thus they remain immune from
punishment and the only persons who are
charged with crimes are the minor figures in
the xackets-the lowly policy runner, the prostitute, or the narcotics pusher, all of whom are
at the bottom of the ladder. They are the only
ones who do something that the police can see
and testify about and therefore they are the
only ones who are arrested and charged with a
crime.
"The telephone is not only a means offaciliating crime but it may be the very instrumenality for committing certain types of crime. It
is almost invariably used in such crimes as extortion and kidnapping, and is, of course, the
very sine qua non of bookmaking, call girl operations and lewd, obscene or threatening telephone calls. How absurd it is to grant complete
immunity to criminals to use the telephone for
such purposes without fear of detection!" 7
The Congress, in 1968, indicated its endorsement of the Wilson position. "Organized criminals," the Congress asserted in findings appended
to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act,
Section 801 (c), "make extensive use of wire and
oral communications in their criminal activities.
The interception of such communications to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or to
prevent their commission is an indispensable aid
to law enforcement and the administration of justice." 3
Agreeably to this finding, Congress established
a "[p]rocedure for interception of wire or oral
communications." 39 The procedure is set down as
follows:
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or
oral communication shall be made in writing
upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state the applicant's
authority to make such application. Each ap'7 Statement of Orlando W. Wilson, mimeographed
for distribution at Illinois Crime Commission Hearings
of February 5, 6, 1965. (Emphasis in original.)
I P.L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 7 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1495. 1511 (1968).
39Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, §802, amending 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
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plication shall include the following information:
"(a) the identity of the investigative or law
enforcement officer making the application,
and the officer authorizing the application;
"(b) a full and complete statement of the
facts and circumstances relied upon by the
applicant, to justify his belief that an order
should be issued, including (i) details as to the
particular offense that has been, is being, or is
about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of communications
sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of
the person, if known, committing the offense
and whose communications are to be intercepted;
"(c) a full and complete statement as to
whether or not other investigative procedures
have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if
tried or to be too dangerous;
"(d) a statement of the period of time for
which the interception is required to be maintained .... ,0
Accommodating Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, to the employment of
this authority to intercept telephonic communications under judicial orders issued upon probable
cause a Congress plainly manifested its intent to
lay open to reasonable searches and seizures the
previously sacrosanct, clandestine criminal acts
committed in whole or in part by means of the
telephone.
This amendment of Section 605, in order to be
40 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, P.L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 18 U.S.C. § 2518
(1968).
41The extent of the change accomplished by this
accommodation is open to some doubt. To balance the
absolute view adopted by such cases as the GuglielmoCaplan-Dote series, that all telephonic communication
has ever been completely protected against interception, by anyone, a number of cases took the position
that this protection did not apply if the communication
was itself unlawful. See United States v. Beckley, 259
F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ga. 1965), where the court held that
the protections of Section 605 "were never intended for,
nor do they cover, such communications which are
themselves illegal." Id. at 573, citing Casey v. United
States, 191 F.2d 1,4 (9th Cir. 1951). To the same effect,
see United States v. Hanna, 260 F. Supp. 430 (S.D. Fla.
1966); United States v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281 (9th Cir.
1955).

fully effective, must also affect the accretions of
time and decisional law which have accumulated
upon the statute. Among those accretions are the
decisions in United States v. Guglielmo,0 United
States v. Caplan,0 and United States v. Dote.M The
implications of those decisions, of fair singularity
prior to the amendment of Section 605, assume
remarkable peculiarity in the post-amendment
context.
United States v. Guglielmo was a prosecution for
violation of federal gambling laws. Defendants
moved to suppress evidence consisting of "[p]en
register tapes which recorded the calls from defendants' lines" as a result of "the request of
agents of the Internal Revenue Service." 45 "Neither the defendants nor the parties called knew of
or acquiesced in this Internal Revenue request," 46
which was honored by the Illinois Bell Telephone
Company.
The defendants supported their motion to suppress with the argument that the use of records
made by the pen register and employed "to further
develop leads and to conduct gambling investigations resulting in the obtaining of search warrants
which produced the instant indictments,"
amounted to a "violation of the Federal Communications Act (Title 47, U.S.C.)."
The court first supplied this description of the
pen register:
"The pen register is a mechanical device attached on occasion to a given telephone line,
usually at central telephone offices. A pulsation of the dial on a line to which the pen register is attached records on a paper tape dashes
equal to the number dialed. The paper tape
then becomes a permanent record of outgoing
calls as well as numbers called on a particular
line. Immediately after the number is dialed
and before the line called has had an opportunity to answer (actually the pen register had
no way of determining or recording whether or
not the calls are answered) the pen register
mechanically and automatically is disconnected. There is neither recording nor monitoring of the conversation." 4s
Upon this description, and in consideration of
42
43Supra note 2.

Supra note 3.

44
Supra note 4.
4
1 Supra note
46
Ibid.
47
bid.
48

Id. at 535.

2, at 534.
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defendants' arguments, the court in Guglielmo con- osition that "the furnishing by the telephone
cluded that "the instant unconsented use of a pen company to I.R.S. agents of pen register data
register violated the integrity of telephone com- constituted divulgence of the existence of communications and the clear prohibition of § 605." 4
munications in violation of the statute." 17 In this
It dismissed the indictments: "The fruits of such reflection the Caplan court was dearly correct,
a violation are, of course, inadmissible in evidence,
inasmuch as the Guglielmo court had held that, as
much as proper investigation and alert detection a product of the use of a pen register, "[t]he
of crime should be encouraged. (Nardonev. United existence of a communication was divulged.... "
States, 308 U.S. 338)." 50
It was this divulgence, of the existence of a comThe Government appealed this decision. Before munication, which the Guglielino court, in view of
the opinion in this appeal was issued sub nor. the Section 605 decree that ".... no person not
United States v. Dote,51 the Cuglielmo decision was being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
2
considered in United States v. Caplan.5
communication and divulge or publish the existIn Caplan, also a gambling case, the court con- ence, contents.., or meaning of such intercepted
sidered "motions filed on behalf of all twenty-five communication to any person... ,"
had found
defendants indicted herein to quash search war- to be in "dear and unequivocal" contravention
rants issued by another judge of this court," of the "language of the statute." 69But the Caplan
because of an alleged violation of Section 605.14 court was not content merely to adopt this posiThe foundation of these assertions was the con- tion.
tention that "the use of a pen register, under the
Instead, the Caplan court found that the use of
circumstances, constituted the 'interception' of a the pen register "... . constituted the 'intercepcommunication, an act forbidden by the second tion' of a communication." 11Further, it held, in
clause of § 605 and prohibited from communica- opposition to the Government's contention that
tion to others regardless of any authorization there was no "'interception' of a communication
from anyone other than the sender or the re- since the pen register only records the fact that a
number was dialed ... , " 62 that the fact of dialing
ceiver." 11
The Caplan court, adopting a description of the the telephone is per se communication.
This holding was offered together with the
pen register which strikingly resembled that set
down in Guglielmo,"l cited Gugliehmo for the prop- Guglielmo rationale "as an alternate basis for
holding that the government made forbidden use
49 Id. at 536.
of the pen register data ....
"1 Itwas reached by
so Ibid.
reasoning
which
left
something
to be desired:
11Supra note 4.
12 Supra note 3.
"To the government's argument that no 'comId. at 806.
munication' was intercepted, defendants, in
'Ibid.
"Ibid.
66Note 48 supraand accompanying text.
pen register is of very limited territorial signifiThe description of the pen register furnished in the
cance. It is practically significant only when the teleUnited States v. Caplan, supra note 3, read as follows:
phone company, or law enforcement, wishes to determine what local, or non-toll, numbers are being called
"The pen register is a device attached to a given
from a given telephone. The telephone company's
telephone line usually at a central telephone office.
automatic billing equipment, in the ordinary course of
A pulsation of the dial on the line to which the pen
business, makes similar records of every toll call. So, as
register is attached records on a paper tape dashes
an interesting sidelight, Caplan and Dote, and perhaps
equal in number to the number dialed. The paper
Guglielmo, stand also for the proposition that
tape then becomes a permanent and complete
telephonic communications made within the toll zone
record of outgoing numbers called on a particular
are entitled to a higher level of privacy than telephonic
line. With reference to incoming calls, the pen
communications made between toll zones, a very
register records only a dash for each ring of the
elevated level indeed, considering that toll calls aretelephone but does not identify the number from
or were-deemed entitled to a higher level of privacy
which the incoming call originated. The pen register
than mere face to face conversation.
cuts off after the number is dialed on outgoing calls
,7Supra note 3, at 807. (Emphasis added.)
and after the ringing is concluded on incoming calls
Is
Supra note 2, at 536.
without determining whether the call is completed
5948 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1962),
or the receiver is answered. There is neither requoted in id. at 535-36.
cording nor monitoring of the conversation." 255 F.
60Id.at 536.
Supp. at 807.
61Supra note 3, at 806.
Oddly enough, none of the courts in the Guglielmo12 Id. at 806-07.
Caplan-Dote series of cases adverted to the fact that
11Id. at 808.
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open court, demonstrated that it was possible
to dial a number and to permit the phone to
ring a specified number of times and then to
hang up. When this was done, the pen register
dutifully recorded the fact that the number
was called. History affords us the illustration
of a prearranged signal. Paul Revere's associate, who hung a lantern in the Old North
Church, would hardly have been exculpated
at a trial for treason if he had argued that he
was not sending a communication, but only
illuminating the befrey." 64
This reasoning was deficient in at least two
respects. The first of these deficiencies lay in the
choice of example. In a generation which has
perfected the artful use of the person-to-person
call (placed to a person who does not exist, or is in
fact making the call, in order to convey information to the answering party without incurring toll
charges), the call to be made at a specified time
(but not to be answered), and the use of an agreedupon number of rings at a specified time (again,
without the call being answered), as commonplace
methods of fraud upon telephone companies, it
is hardly necessary to exhume the revolutionary
communications methods of Paul Revere to
demonstrate that actual conversation is not always
required for the transmission of information over
a distance.
The second deficiency was the product, in part,
of the first. By hearkening back to Paul Revere,
the court was able to avoid the implications of
defendants' persuasive demonstration in open
court. Evading those implications in turn permitted the court to duck the genuine issue thus
raised.
That issue is not whether it is possible to contrive to convey information by use of the telephone
without actually talking, or incurring the tariffs
imposed upon such telephonic communication.
Rather it is whether "the Congress" by indicating
"a policy of protecting the privacy of telephone
subscribers from invasion by law enforcement
officers as well as others who may be less well
motivated," 65consciously intended also to protect
those who undertake to use the protected system
without paying for it (a species of theft), together
with those who set out to employ it as an easy,
convenient, and secure means to the commission
of more serious offenses.
64Ibid.
65Ibid.
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The failure of the Caplan court to perceive these
deficiencies created a precedent for the notion
that the mechanical preliminaries to telephonic
communication-dialing the telephone--are themselves communication, and protected as such.
That suggestion was speedily taken up by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in decision of the appeal of Guglielmo,66 sub nom. United
States v. Dote. 7 In an opinion more notable for
its dogged eclecticism than for its selectivity
among available rationales, the Dote court blithely
grounded its decision not only upon the "wellreasoned memorandum opinion reported as United
States v. Guglielmo .. .,8"
but also upon the
presumably equally-"well-reasoned opinion...
reported as United States v. Caplan ... , " 11 thereafter contriving to intensify the misfortune created
by the Caplan decision.
Caplan reflected a belief that the mechanical
preliminaries to telephonic communication are
themselves communication, and protected as such.
Dote, uncritically synthesizing Caplan and Guglielmo, produced the outright declaration that the
"ringing of the telephone... may of itself be a
communication. ... -70 Rejecting the Government's argument, "that § 605 applies only to
substantive communications, that is, to interchanges of thought,"
the Dote court passed
perilouslyclose to adjudication of the question
along the more restricted lines of the Guglielno
decision--"Our concern in the instant case is
whether the existence of an intercepted communication was divulged or published," 72-- before
concluding:
"The ringing of a telephone may be more
than merely a signal indicating a call. Even if
a call is not answered, a call at a certain time,
or a certain number of rings, or repeated calls
may well be a prearranged message or signal.
The ringing of the telephone, therefore, may of
itself be a communication, and a device, attached to the telephone line, which indicates
to a third party that such a communication is
taking place or is about to take place, inter66
67

Sitpranote 2.

Supra note 4.
"Id. at 178.
69Id.at 179.
70 Id. at 181.
71
Id.at 180.
72
Id.at 181.
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cepts it. United States v. Caplan, supra, 255
F. Supp. at 808." 7
The principal, initial difficulty with this equation of mechanical preliminaries to conversation to
(protected) communication is its necessary effect
upon the definition of the word: communication.
The equation, if enforced, cuts the word loose
from its moorings, and effectively deprives it of
any determinable meaning. If dialing a telephone
is to be treated as communication simply because
it is a step in the process of positioning the prospective communicator to deliver his communication,
then it becomes virtually impossible to exlude from
the definition of communicatiot any physical activity ultimately contributing to an exchange of
thought. Unless the distinction between communication and noncommunication is to vary
arbitrarily, depositing coins in a pay telephone
would appear to be a form of communication,
together with entering the phone booth, securing
change for currency, and so on. It is not too much
to say that if dialing in order to signal without
incurring tariffs amounts to protected conmunication, then the use of a device to bewilder the tollcalculating equipment in order to converse without
paying tariffs, ought' also to be protected comnmuniationY4 Put simply, the Dote decision suggests
that the premium of protection is, or may be,
payable in the coinage of criminal ingenuity: no
matter what is done, it is protected so long as it
bears some faint connection with telephonic communication.
The implications of this position cannot be
escaped by mere reference to the 1968 amendment
of Section 605, 71 to permit judicially-ordered
73Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
74 The decision in United States v. Hanna supra dealt
with precisely this question. Defendants employed
what was known as a "blue box" to emit tones which
activated long-distance circuits without activating the
telephone compnay's billing equipment, thus defrauding the company and incidentally enabling defendants
to conduct a rather ambitious, inter-toll-zone, interstate, gaming operation. The court rejected defendants'
contention that this use of the "blue box" was congressionally intended for protection under Section 605.
More recently, the newspapers carried reports of a
blind college student, born with perfect pitch, who had
learned to confuse the long-distance circuitry by
whistling into the handset, thus accomplishing the
same ends as the "blue box," and perhaps furnishing
some hope for the ultimate replacement of the machine
by human beings, as an incident of his deplorable
behavior.
7 Supra note 40.

interception of telephonic communications, upon
a demonstration of probable cause. Under the
Osborn-Berger-Katz decisions, conversation is a
thing protected in possession by the Fourth
Amendment. To seize it, a warrant or order is
required. It is not very far from the concept of
conversation-as-thing to communication-as-thing,
and, if that distance is travelled, some serious
practical problems for law enforcement are presaged.
Those problems, proceeding from the random
development of decisional and statutory law on
the subject of telecommunications as most strikingly exemplified in the Gugliimo-Caplan-Dote
series of decisions, consist principally of the possibility that it may prove almost impossible, in
cases involving crimes committed by means of the
telephone, to secure the probable cause needed for
interception, without violating the law in the
process. To secure the warrant or order needed
for such interception, it is necessary to demonstrate
some present knowledge concerning the nature
and purpose of the communication activity believed
to be criminal, in order to show probable cause
to the reviewing magistrate. But, if preliminary,
mechanical activity, such as dialing the telephone,
is communication, and if communication is protected by the Fourth Amendment, then evidence
showing the numbers called, and the frequency
with which they are called may not be secured and
divulged without an order or warrant. Thus the
paradox: an order for interception may be had,
but only upon a showing of facts constitutionally
obtainable only with a warrant. In other words,
the officer must secure a warrant in order to
secure the facts he needs to get the warrant.
Presumably, or at least hopefully, some court
of fair impressiveness will discern a way to eliminate such problems, perhaps by restoring to such
words as communication the definitions they enjoyed prior to the time when the process of expanding Section 605 commenced, rendering them meaningless. As it is, law enforcement officers (and their
legal advisors) might well limit themselves to a
very measured confidence in the permanency of
the revolution wrought in the law of telecommunications by the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968. And one prudent manifestation of such caution might take the form of
disciplined restraint in the use of the pen register.

